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The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in
the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Jide Nzelibe∗
Under the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures, a party that has been injured by a
scofflaw state’s failure to comply with its trade obligations may retaliate against the
scofflaw state by withdrawing equivalent trade concessions. Legal and economic
commentators generally view retaliation as an economically perverse strategy for
enforcing free trade norms. This Article explores an alternative explanation, arguing that
retaliation may provide the optimal enforcement mechanism for trade liberalization given
the prevalence of low compliance incentives and high enforcement costs in international
cooperation agreements. This Article argues that retaliation is superior to other remedial
options because it enables an injured state to inflict maximum political costs on the
scofflaw state by mobilizing powerful export groups in the scofflaw state against
protectionist policies. Furthermore, this Article shows how the presence of significant
protectionist groups in the injured state, which stand to benefit from retaliatory measures,
also improves the injured state’s ability to commit to retaliation. Even if states have
asymmetric preferences about protectionist policies, however, retaliation threats can still
be credible since there is uncertainty about each state’s retaliation costs. Finally, this
Article concludes that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the substantial role of
uncertainty in this model suggests that specific performance, and not compensation, ought
to be the goal of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant innovations of the 1994 Uruguay round of trade talks
was the formalization of a dispute resolution or enforcement mechanism under the
auspices of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).1 At the heart of this enforcement
mechanism is the principle of retaliation or negative reciprocity. Specifically, the WTO
authorizes states that are harmed by uncured rule violations to retaliate by suspending
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See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15 1994, in World Trade
Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

equivalent “concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.”2 In other
words, the enforcement strategy under the WTO is a tit-for-tat approach; if state A is
found to breach its obligations to state B, and state A refuses to remedy the breach, state
B can suspend an equivalent measure of its market access obligations to state A.
Economists and legal scholars typically view retaliation as an economically
perverse strategy for enforcing free trade norms.3 Indeed, retaliation seems to flout the
most basic conflict of interest principles by making protectionist groups–the very enemies
of free trade at home–the beneficiaries of the WTO’s remedial scheme. Understandably,
these critics recommend that the current retaliation system be replaced by more trade
friendly alternatives, such as mandatory monetary compensation or collectively-imposed
sanctions.
This Article explores an alternative explanation of the retaliation mechanism,
arguing that it provides the optimal enforcement strategy for trade liberalization given the
prevalence of two major obstacles to international cooperation: low compliance
incentives and high enforcement costs. By providing incentives for domestic interest
groups to monitor violations and to follow through on enforcement threats, the
retaliation mechanism perpetuates credibility in the WTO’s dispute resolution
mechanism. Two major interest group dynamics characterize this enforcement strategy.
First, retaliation increases compliance by mobilizing powerful interest groups in the
scofflaw state—export interests—to fight against pro-protectionist policies. While other
commentators have also observed this specific attribute of retaliation,4 they have not
sufficiently analyzed its public choice features in the context of alternative remedial
schemes. As a compliance strategy, targeting export groups for retaliation is optimal
because it is self-enforcing and it exacts the maximum political costs on politicians in the
Negotiations (1999) (hereinafter WTO Agreement). Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement largely
incorporates the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs of 1947. See General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194 (hereinafter GATT).
2

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Art.22.2, WTO
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scofflaw state. In contrast, an alternative remedy like monetary compensation would not
only lack a self-enforcing mechanism, it would also tend to deflect the costs of noncompliance among a weak, widely dispersed, interest group. Other remedial alternatives,
such as collective enforcement or suspension, are also inadequate either because they
oversupply protectionist benefits or are simply not credible.
Second, since retaliation provides a substantial benefit to protectionist groups in
the injured country, it increases the credibility of enforcement threats. Ordinarily, threats
by an injured country to retaliate against a scofflaw state by raising tariffs may lack
credibility because retaliation imposes a welfare loss on the injured state. An injured state
may nonetheless be willing to retaliate if retaliation enables it to meet the demands of a
domestic protectionist audience. Thus, the presence of a politically significant
protectionist group improves the injured state’s ability to commit to retaliation by making
retaliation less political costly. Paradoxically, this interest group dynamic suggests a
somewhat counterintuitive result: in a world where certain states have incentives to defect
from their trade obligations, a state that faces significant domestic protectionist pressures might
better serve the liberalization goals of the WTO because such a state can better signal its resolve
to commit to a course of retaliation.
An important feature of the foregoing framework is the role of uncertainty or
asymmetric information, in which each state is uncertain about the other’s true political
costs of retaliation. Were complete information available, a state with a strong
protectionist domestic audience would have an incentive to breach its commitments to a
state with a weak domestic protectionist audience. This is because a state that is less able
to generate domestic political support for protectionist policies is less likely to commit
itself to a long course of retaliation. Assuming a rational choice model, however, threats
to retaliate may still be credible because it is very difficult for a state to observe the true
political costs of retaliation to another state and certain states may have an incentive to
misrepresent such costs. Thus, even if a particular state lacks a significant protectionist
domestic audience, it may have a strong incentive to mimic the behavior of a state that
does in order to deter prospective scofflaw states from breaching their international trade
obligations.

3

The importance of uncertainty in this model suggests that, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, the goals of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism ought to be
specific performance rather than compensation.5 Optimal deterrence occurs not
necessarily when retaliation actually takes place, but when there is a threat to retaliate and
there is considerable uncertainty about the political costs or benefits of retaliation to the
injured state. Sustained non-compliance undermines this uncertainty feature, however, by
enabling the scofflaw state to discern the injured state’s true preferences regarding
retaliation. For instance, a scofflaw state would be able to discern that an injured state has
high retaliation costs if the injured state is put to the test and is unable to retaliate for a
sustained period of time. Because of this involuntary information disclosure, such an
injured state may no longer have threats that are credible to deter the scofflaw state (or
any other state) from future violations. This information-forcing role that is inherent in a
compensation model of enforcement is potentially destabilizing to the free trade regime.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some relevant background on the
relationship between free trade agreements and domestic interest groups. Part II examines
the tactical role that retaliation plays in using export groups to force politicians in the
scofflaw state to internalize the costs of protectionist measures. This Part explores briefly
other alternatives to retaliation, such as monetary compensation and group sanctions, and
concludes that retaliation is superior to these alternatives as an enforcement strategy. Part
III explores how, in the presence of uncertainty regarding a state’s domestic preferences,
protectionist groups may influence a state’s ability to make credible enforcement threats.
Part IV explores the role of uncertainty in the ongoing debate regarding the remedial
goals of the WTO enforcement regime and concludes that specific performance is
preferable to a compensation approach.
TRADE AGREEMENTS, RECIPROCITY, AND INTEREST GROUPS

I.

For many years, economists and political scientists have attempted to explain
international cooperation as the result of the interaction of rational egoists acting to
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maximize aggregate welfare or some other conception of the national interest.6 In these
state-centered models, the role of domestic actors in formulating international trade
policy was largely ignored. Recently, however, influenced by the insights of public choice
theory, more commentators are beginning to explain international trade agreements in
terms of the competition for influence by domestic interest groups.7 In this model,
commentators do not pay much attention to states and political actors because they are
regarded merely as tools for transmitting the preferences of dominant domestic interest
groups.
According to the interest group approach, states enter into international trade
agreements not necessarily because they seek to maximize aggregate welfare but because
they are responding to pressure from special industry interests.

8

Indeed, interest group

theory predicts that politicians have very little incentive to focus on the interests of
consumer groups that benefit from trade liberalization since such groups tend to lack
political influence due to collective action problems. Rather, free trade agreements can be
explained as the result of the emerging political influence of export-oriented groups
seeking increased access to foreign markets. As more free trade agreements are signed,
and the gains from liberalization are consolidated, the political power of these exportoriented groups grows relative to that of protectionist groups.9 But since domestic
protectionist groups still command significant political influence, very few free trade
agreements completely liberalize trade. Rather, most free trade agreements provide for
6

See, e.g., John Kennan and Raymond Reizman, Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars, 29 INT’L ECON. REV.
81 (1988); David A. Lake, Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures,
28 INT’L STUD. Q. 143 (1984); Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, 28
WORLD POL. 317 (1976); Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. ECON. STUD. 21
(1954). For a detailed critique of the state-centered or structural approach see Timothy J. McKeown, The
Limitations of “Structural” Theories of Commercial Policy, 40 INT’L ORG. 43 (1986).
7

See e.g., Alan Sykes & Warren Schwartz, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution
in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 194-95 (2002); ROBERT BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY (1996); Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84
AMER. ECO. REV. 84, 84-86 (1994). For a more in depth comparison of the state-centered and interest
group approaches see John Ikenberry, David Lake & Michael Mastunduno, Introduction: Approaches to
Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy, 42 INT’L ORG. 1 (1988).
8

See Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Trade Wars and Trade Talks, 103 J POL. ECON. 675, 676
(1995).
9

See Sykes & Schwartz, The Economic Structure, supra note 7 at 194-95.
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some level of tariff protection and also provide for some safeguards, such as Article IX of
the GATT, which enable states to grant temporary protection to ailing import-competing
industries.10
Both the empirical evidence and the institutional framework of international trade
regimes support the interest group explanation of international trade agreements.11 For
instance, the role of reciprocity in the international bargaining process suggests that most
states treat access to their markets as precious assets that they are only willing to give up
in exchange for equivalent access to foreign markets. This approach makes sense if we
assume that politicians are willing to sacrifice political support from protectionist groups
in return only for more substantive support from export interest groups. It does not make
much sense, however, if one adopts the state-centered assumption that states only seek to
maximize aggregate welfare. As economists concede, states simply seeking to maximize
aggregate welfare would chose free trade as the dominant strategy regardless of the
strategy of other states.12 But why then would states seek concessions in order to do what
is ostensibly in their interests? As Paul Krugman has observed, the reciprocity approach to
trade bargaining cannot be understood purely in economic terms:
Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations
eventually realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they are
a game scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exports .
. . is a victory, and an increase in imports . . . is a defeat. The implicit
mercantilist theory does not make sense . . . but it nonetheless governs actual
policy.13

10

See Alan Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with
Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259 (1991).
11

See Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Integrating the Perspectives of Economists
and Political Scientists, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY (Feenstra et. al ed., 1996) (listing
empirical studies providing support for interest group explanation of international trade policy).
12
13

Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J ECON. LIT. 113, 113 (1997).
Id. at 114.
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The principle of reciprocity inherent in international trade negotiations also
features elsewhere in the WTO/GATT legal system. For instance, under the
renegotiation provision of Article XXVIII of the GATT, a state may propose to modify or
withdraw a tariff to which it has previously agreed in a prior negotiation.14 If the state fails
to reach an agreement with any state that would be affected by the proposed new tariff,
however, it is free to make the change, but the affected states are allowed to withdraw
substantially equivalent concessions. 15
Finally, reciprocity also plays a role in the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. Under
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), if a panel or appellate body
concludes that a member has breached its obligations under a covered agreement, it will
recommend that such a member “bring the measure into conformity with the
agreement.”16 If the non-compliant member fails to conform within a reasonable period of
time, then the DSU requires that such a member enter into negotiations over
compensation with the injured member.17 The DSU makes it clear, however, that
compensation is only be a temporary measure, and that compliance with the panel’s
recommendations is the desired outcome.18 If negotiations over compensation fail, the
injured member may request authority to suspend trade concessions “equivalent to the
level of nullification and impairment.”19 Once again, however, the DSU clarifies that this

14

See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXVIII(2) (“In such negotiations and agreement . . . , the contracting
parties concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous
concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such
negotiations.”).
15

Id. at art XXVIII(3)(a) (“[T]he contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the
concession shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and if such action is taken any contracting party with which
such concession as initially negotiated . . . shall then be free . .. to withdraw . . . substantially equivalent
concessions negotiated with the applicant contracting party.”).
16

DSU, supra note 2, art. 19.1.

17

Id. art. 22.2.

18

Id. art. 22.1 (“Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary
measures available in the event that recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable
period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.”).
19

Id. art. 22.4
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retaliation remedy is temporary and should last only until the scofflaw member complies
with the panel’s recommendations. 20
EXPORT INTEREST GROUP LINKAGE IN ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE

II.

AGREEMENTS
The consequences of how the interaction of domestic interest groups affects the
negotiation of international trade agreements has been elaborated on in a number of
studies over the past couple of decades.21 But studies of how such interest groups affect
the enforcement mechanism have been less developed. For instance, although there have
been public choice studies on how retaliation encourages export groups to favor
liberalization policies,22 such studies overlook any comparison of the efficacy of retaliation
to alternative enforcement mechanisms. The following two sections argue that retaliation
is superior to the myriad other remedial alternatives because it best forces the scofflaw
state to internalize the political costs of non-compliance.
A.

Retaliation as a Strategy for Mobilizing Export Groups against Protectionist
Policies
The key role that protectionist interest groups play in fomenting the violation of

international trade agreements is well documented. Once one recognizes that domestic
pressures provide politicians with incentives to renege on their prior international trade
commitments, it becomes necessary to establish enforcement regimes of varying intricacy
to handle these problems. Interestingly, one would expect that the best remedial strategy,
from an economic point of view, would punish the protectionists responsible for the
20

Id. art. 22.1.

21

See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, supra note 7 at 111; Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The
Politics of Free Trade Agreements, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 667 (1995); Robert Baldwin & Richard Clarke,
Game-modeling Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 9 J POL. MOD. 257 (1987).
22

See , e.g., Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the
Liberalization of Trade, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133, 144-46 (Anne O.
Krueger, ed. 1998); see also Mark Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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breach and compensate the export interest groups that have been injured by the loss of
trade concessions. But such a strategy overlooks a fairly insuperable obstacle: the
sovereignty of the state parties to the agreement. In other words, the existence of
intervening independent political institutions makes it fairly difficult for export interest
groups from one state to influence directly the incentives of protectionist groups in
another state.
In view of the significant political access costs associated with the first-best
solution, a second-best approach that takes account of the actual interest group dynamics
that exist across sovereign borders is preferable. One such approach involves the strategic
use of tariff schedules by the home state to mobilize export interest groups in a foreign
state against protectionist groups within the same state. This is precisely the strategy
embraced by the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. In other words, retaliation has the
property of making political decisions that benefit protectionist interest groups directly
adverse to the interests of domestic export interest groups.
The political economy of retaliation involves the strategic interaction between
domestic export interest groups and their foreign counterparts. This strategic interaction
can be decomposed into two stages:
1.

The information production stage: this is when export interest groups in an
injured state inform their politicians about a possible breach and attempt to
lobby for a response.

2.

The response stage: This is when the export interest groups in the injured state
lobby for targeted retaliation to inflict the most damage on strategic export
interests in the scofflaw state.
At the information production stage, the export interest groups perform an

educational function by making politicians in the injured state aware of the possible
breach of a trade obligation by the scofflaw state. To the extent the injury caused by the
treaty-inconsistent behavior of a foreign state is concentrated on few export interests,
they are likely to overcome collective action problems and lobby for a political response.

9

Politicians in the injured state who fail to respond to the scofflaw state’s breach of its
trade commitments can expect to pay a heavy price in terms of lost political patronage by
these export groups. Because consumers typically suffer from collective action problems,
however, it is safe to assume that the politicians may be willing to impose welfare losses on
consumers to satisfy the demands of export interest groups. But this does not mean that
the optimal political choice will always be retaliation. For instance, an injured state may
decide it is expedient to avoid or postpone retaliation, especially if it believes that less
aggressive mechanisms—such as negotiation—may resolve the trade dispute.
At the response stage, the politicians in the injured state have to decide how best
to induce the politicians in the scofflaw state to comply with their trade commitments. It
is safe to assume that export interest groups reward politicians not only when they
institute retaliation, but also when they have successfully induced the scofflaw state to
comply with its obligations. Politicians in the injured state will thus have an incentive to
choose the optimal mix of retaliation strategies that will best mobilize the scofflaw state’s
export interest groups against protectionism.
Mobilization is not costless, however. Indeed, mobilization entails prevailing over
collective action problems that can be fairly severe. Interest group theory teaches that the
greater the concentration of an industry, the greater the likelihood that it will organize
because the largest firms will bear a significant share of the benefits.23 Thus, if retaliation
targets a wide range of industries, mobilization will be difficult because of free-rider
problems. Therefore, the injured state has an incentive to engage in targeted retaliation
and focus on a discrete group of powerful industries that it believes will put sufficient
pressure on politicians in the scofflaw state.
The EC’s approach in the recent dispute over steel tariffs with the United States
illustrates this retaliation strategy. Citing injury to the United States steel industry from
increased steel imports, in March 2002 the United States decided to impose 30 percent
tariffs on most imported flat-rolled steel products and 15 percent tariffs on rebar and

23

For the discussion of the collective action difficulties faced by large and diffuse interest groups, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 33-43 (1965).
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stainless steel.24 The EC, Japan, Korea, and Brazil immediately filed a claim against the
steel tariffs before the WTO arguing that they violated a variety of non-discriminatory
WTO provisions. After prevailing before the WTO’s appellate body,25 the EC published a
retaliation list that threatened sanctions against $2.2 billion worth of United States goods
unless the United States lifted the steel tariffs by early December 2003.26 Of particular
interest, however, was the political dynamics of the EC’s retaliation strategy. The EC
understood that the disputed steel tariffs would help shore up political support for
President Bush in certain swing states like West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio. In
response, the EC specifically targeted a range of industries for retaliation located in states
that are likely to be political battlegrounds in the 2004 presidential election such as
Florida, South Carolina, Washington, and North Carolina.27 For instance, as much as 100
percent tariffs were going to be tacked unto certain goods like fruit juices, apples, dried
vegetables, t-shirts, and other products from these battleground states.

28

The EC

ostensibly put the President into a political dilemma: he could keep the steel tariffs and
reap political spoils in Ohio and Pennsylvania, or he could face a political backlash from
industries subject to retaliation in states like Florida. On the eve of the EC’s retaliation
deadline, President Bush decided to scrap the steel tariffs.29
The United States’ approach in the European Community (EC) Bananas case is
also another example of the use of a politically calibrated retaliation strategy.30 In 1999,
24

See Presidential Proclamation No. 7529, March 5, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 10553 (March 7, 2002).

25

See WTO Appellate Body, United States--Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS248 /AB/R (adopted Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org.
26

Actually a provisional retaliation list was released by the EC in the summer of 2002. See Council
Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 (June 13, 2002), available on http://europa.eu.int.
27

See James Cox, Sparks Fly over U.S.-E.U. Trade, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2003, at A3 (discussing
political benefits to George Bush of steel tariffs and the political sensitivity of threatened retaliation by the
EC).
28

See Council Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 (June 13, 2002), available on http://europa.eu.int.

29

See Bush Ends Steel Safeguard Tariffs in Face of Threat by EU to Retaliate, 20 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 2021 (Dec. 11, 2003).
30

For the panel report on the EC-Bananas dispute, see WTO Panel Report on the European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22,
1997). For the appellate body report, see WTO Report of the Appellate Body on the European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
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the United States imposed 100 percent duties on a range of European imports worth $192
million after the EC refused to conform its banana import regime to a WTO ruling. 31 In
imposing these sanctions, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) deliberately
targeted a range of key products from powerful European industrial sectors and imposed
tariffs that were sufficiently high to preclude those products altogether from the American
market.32 The list of products affected by the tariffs were very specific and were chosen by
the USTR with input from interested members of the American business community.
Thus, rather than imposing lower tariffs on a much wider range of products, which would
have created collective action problems, the USTR focused on a narrower (but
significant) cluster of industries, which would face less obstacles in organizing and
applying political pressure on the scofflaw state’s politicians.
Commentary and actions by politicians and business interests on both sides of the
Atlantic suggests that the United States’ retaliation strategy in the EC Bananas dispute
was quite effective. For instance, by early as mid-1999, Italy, which saw its lucrative handbag industry shut-out from the American market by the prohibitive tariffs, was eager to
settle the dispute.33 When compliance was not forthcoming initially, the United States
Congress decided to up the ante and passed legislation in May 2000 that explicitly
required the USTR to rotate retaliatory tariffs every 180 days if a country continues not to
comply with WTO rulings.34 Shortly afterwards, the USTR proposed new EC products
1997). For an in-depth and detailed review of the controversy underlying this famous dispute, see Raj
Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L REV 839 (2000).
31

See USTR Press Release 99-17, United States takes Customs Actions on European Imports (Mar. 3,
1999), available at www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/03/99-60.pdf., (hereinafter USTR Bananas Press Release).
For the DSU arbitration decision authorizing the United States to suspend concessions, see European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas European Communities—
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO/DS27/ARB
(April 9, 1999) (hereinafter EC-US Bananas Arbitration Decision). The United States picked the earlier
date of March 3 to impose retaliatory measures because that was the date the arbitration panel’s decision
was originally due. See Daniel Pruzin, US Blocks EU Request for Banana Panel While Hormone Beef Issue
Simmers at WTO, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 945 (June 2, 1999).
32

See USTR Bananas Press Release, supra note 31.

33

See James Blitz and Frances Williams, Italians Urge EU to Retreat in Banana Dispute with the U.S.,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990, at 6.
34

This “carousel” sanctions plan was part of the African and Caribbean Trade Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000), codified in various sections of 19 U.S.C. (2000).
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that would be targeted by retaliation and sought comments as to whether the then
existing 100 percent tariffs were high enough to induce compliance.35 Faced with even
more concentrated prohibitive sanctions, the EC capitulated and decided to settle the
dispute in 2001.36
One significant caveat: the efficacy of a well-calibrated retaliation strategy may
depend on whether it addresses primarily protectionist trade restrictions. To the extent a
restrictive trade measure is multifaceted and substantially affects a broader range of other
politically salient interest groups, then a retaliation remedy may be less effective. For
instance, the United States and Canada recently adopted a fairly calibrated retaliation
strategy in a dispute involving EC restrictions on the importation of hormone-treated beef
products.37 But that strategy has hardly been effective in inducing compliance by the EC.
One possible explanation is that the EC ban on hormone-treated beef might not be
motivated mainly by protectionist reasons but by other factors, such as EC consumer
preferences regarding the health effects of such products. But this limitation in the
WTO’s enforcement mechanism does not necessarily prove that retaliation is an
ineffective strategy; indeed, it might prove the opposite. One might argue, as many
35

See WTO: USTR Steps Up Pressure on EU to Comply with Beef and Banana Rulings, 17 INT’L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 853 (June 1, 2000).
36

See U.S. Trade Representative Announces the Lifting of Sanctions on European Products as EU
Opens Market to U.S. Banana Distributors (July 1, 2001), USTR Press Release, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/pp0701.htm; USTR Press Release 01-23, Joint United States—
European Union Press Release: U.S. Government and European Commissions Reach Agreement to Resolve
Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001).
37

In 1999, after the EC refused to comply with a WTO ruling that its restrictions were inconsistent
with the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary Phytosanitary Measures (the “SPS”
Agreement), the United States sought WTO authorization to retaliate. See European Communities–
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)—Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999). After the WTO approved
level of tariff suspensions worth $116.8 million, the United States imposed 100 percent retaliatory tariffs on
a specific range of EC agricultural products. USTR Announces Final Product List in Beef Hormones
Dispute, USTR Press Release, July 19, 1999, available at www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/07/99-60.pdf.
(hereinafter USTR Beef Hormones Press Release). Interestingly, in deciding which items to target for
retaliation, the United States also factored in the political influence of the EC member states producing the
item. See Rosemary A. Ford, The Beef Hormone Dispute and Carousel Sanctions: A Roundabout Way of
Forcing Compliance with World Trade Organization Decisions, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L 543, 568 (2002)
(observing that the United States “eventually scaled back the quantity of [pork] products targeted because
it did not want to unfairly burden Denmark, the EU’s largest pork producer, as Denmark is a relatively small
EU member state lacking large political influence.”).
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commentators have suggested, that the WTO’s enforcement mechanism should only
apply to trade restrictive measures that are primarily motivated by protectionism.

38

Indeed, the WTO explicitly provides that members may adopt otherwise discriminatory
measures for a variety of regulatory reasons provided such measures are not disguised
protectionist barriers.39
The foregoing analysis suggests that mobilizing core export interest groups through
targeted retaliation is a key variable in promoting trade liberalization. Facing political
pressure from domestic export groups, politicians in the injured state strategize as to how
to mobilize export groups in order to exert the maximum political costs on the scofflaw
state. The empirical evidence suggests that the politicians in the injured state often
choose a retaliation strategy that applies prohibitively high tariffs to a discrete set of
products from powerful export industries in the scofflaw state. This strategy accords with
what public choice theory predicts, which is that concentrated industries that face
disproportionately large costs or benefits from political decisions are better positioned to
overcome collective action problems.
B.

Evaluating other Remedial Options
By forcing politicians in the scofflaw state to internalize the costs of defecting from

international trade commitments, retaliation has proven to be a fairly reliable
enforcement strategy. Nonetheless, many commentators consider the emphasis on
retaliation in international trade agreements as an obstacle to trade liberalization.40 For
instance, some have argued that retaliation is a perverse enforcement device because it
38
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tends to hurt the injured state’s economy.41 Others argue that it helps entrench
protectionist interests since it implicitly provides benefits to protectionist groups in the
injured state rather than the export groups that have been harmed.

42

These

commentators argue that other remedial options are likely to achieve better compliance.
One remedial option widely endorsed by commentators involves the payment of a
monetary fine to the injured state.43 Economists like monetary fines because unlike
retaliation it does not impose any costs on the injured states and it could be used directly
to compensate export interest groups harmed by trade inconsistent measures. 44
One obvious limitation with the imposition of monetary fines is that it is not a
self-enforcing remedy. In other words, unlike retaliation, the successful imposition of
monetary fines depends on some affirmative act by the scofflaw state. A scofflaw states
that is adjudicated in violation of its international trade commitments may simply refuse
to pay. One way to get around this problem would be to set-up bonding arrangements
where each state contributes a certain amount of money to meet any contingent
obligations. But even this approach will have its limitations. For instance, determining the
appropriate escrow amount for each state would be unduly complex and burdensome.
Moreover, states that are cash-strapped may be unwilling or unable to meet their escrow
obligations. Perhaps because of these difficulties, there are very few examples of
international agreements that incorporate monetary fines as a remedy.
A more significant problem with the monetary fine remedy is that such a measure
is unlikely to have a disciplining effect on politicians in the scofflaw state because the
burden of the fine is likely to be borne by diffuse weak groups. 45 A key feature of a good
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See Anderson, supra note 40 at 128; Charnovitz, supra note 40 at 815-16; Mavroidis, supra note 40 at
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enforcement strategy is its ability to mobilize another powerful domestic interest group
against the interests of the disfavored interest group. A retaliatory strategy that focuses on
the suspension of trade concessions possesses this feature, but monetary fines do not. In
the case of monetary fines, it is a fairly dispersed group of taxpayers in the scofflaw state
that is very likely pick up the tab. Ultimately, politicians facing mounting pressures by
domestic protectionist groups to breach trade commitments are unlikely to be deterred by
the prospect of having to pay fines from a general revenue fund.46
A more nuanced approach would impose the fines directly on the protectionist
groups that instigated the violation of the WTO obligation.47 But there is little reason to
believe that this option is practically feasible. Such an approach will very likely encounter
strong resistance from protectionist groups, which are more likely to overcome collective
action problems than taxpayers. In the end, prudent politicians will try to raise funds from
a source where there are least likely to encounter sustained political resistance, such as a
general judgment fund financed by taxpayers.
Another remedial option involves the imposition of collective sanctions on the
scofflaw state. For instance, Kenneth Abbott has suggested that the WTO adopt a
community sanction approach that would “authoriz[e] the suspension of concessions by
however many contracting parties and in whatever amounts are thought necessary to
induce compliance or to punish bad faith.”48 Again, this approach is problematic because
it will very likely result in the oversupply of protectionist benefits. Third-party states that
are not harmed by a breach will be susceptible to incentives to choose a retaliation
strategy that benefits their domestic protectionist groups rather than one that induces
compliance. This is because export interests groups in a third-party state are likely to be
indifferent to the outcome of the dispute since they are not affected by the breach.
However, politicians in such a state are likely to view an enforcement award as an
46
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opportunity to satisfy the demands of their domestic protectionist constituencies. But
there is no reason to believe that the retaliation strategy chosen by the politicians in the
third party state would be the same as one chosen by a state seeking to induce
compliance. Thus, a collective sanction approach would likely increase the overall level of
trade-distorting policies without providing any offsetting liberalization benefits. A bilateral
retaliation scheme avoids this problem because export interest groups in the injured state
will likely lobby for a retaliation strategy that maximizes political pressure on the scofflaw
state.
III.

PROTECTIONIST GROUPS AS CREDIBILITY AGENTS IN THE WTO’S ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM
A rational state considering defection from an international trade agreement has

to consider not only the potential consequences but also the probability of retaliation. In
other words, such a state will have a greater incentive to defect if it believes that
retaliation is not consistent with the interests of the injured party. But since potentially all
states face welfare losses when they suspend trade concessions, one might wonder why we
do not see more defections in international trade agreements. This Part suggests that one
reason is that protectionist groups in the injured state, who stand to benefit from
retaliatory measures, act as credibility agents in the WTO’s enforcement scheme. The
first section assumes that each state is willing to impose deadweight losses on consumers
in order to placate powerful protectionist interest groups. In such a situation, protectionist
groups improve the injured state’s ability to commit to retaliation in a way that export
groups are not able to do. The next section concludes that given uncertainty about
retaliation costs, threats to retaliate may still be credible even where states have varying
levels of commitment to protectionist policies.
A.

The Dynamics of Interest Groups in Generating Retaliation Credibility
States that enter into international trade agreements ordinarily expect a

significant degree of compliance from each other. But such agreements usually present a
cooperative dilemma because states often face domestic pressures to violate their
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international trade commitments. This feature of international trade agreements has
influenced trade scholars to analyze trade cooperation as a prisoner’s dilemma game, in
which each state has an incentive to cheat but where cooperation is preferable to mutual
defection.49 In the end, cooperation is only feasible because trade agreements are openended bargains where the relationship among the parties is like a repeated game of
infinite duration.50 Since such repeated games provide parties with an opportunity to
retaliate in future periods, the parties have an incentive to cooperate.
Clearly, the utility of a reciprocal strategy to enforce free trade commitments
depends in large part on the belief of the parties that a threat to retaliate is credible. If
state A knows that retaliation is a very costly for State B, state A’s strategy would be to
breach all its future trade commitments to State B. Under what conditions would
retaliation be a credible option for an injured state?
The answer seems to depend on certain interest group dynamics inherent in
international trade agreements. In other words, in order for retaliation to be a credible
strategy for state A, politicians in that state have to be willing to sacrifice the welfare
interests of their constituents for the benefit of a more well-organized interest group that
favors retaliation. One obvious pro-retaliation candidate would be the export interest
groups that have been injured by the violation of the trade agreement. Indeed, as
demonstrated in Part II, such export groups play a critical role in mobilizing politicians to
retaliate against scofflaw nations. 51
Reliance on political pressure from export interest groups alone, however, would
very likely result in a suboptimal retaliation strategy. To shed light on why this is the case,
it would be helpful to view the interaction between a scofflaw state and an injured state in
the post-judgment phase as representing a war of attrition. In a typical war of attrition
49
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model, each state tries to hold out for some benefit with the expectation that the other
side will eventually concede.52 Holding out, however, imposes significant costs on both
parties. In the end, the state that first reaches its breaking point loses the game.
The depiction of the post-judgment phase of the interaction among disputing
states as a war of attrition model is useful for a variety of reasons. First, the scofflaw state
fits the war of attrition model because it will suffer from retaliation costs the longer it
holds out against conforming to its trade obligations. If the scofflaw state is indifferent to
the retaliation costs, then it has no breaking point and the injured state’s strategy is
irrelevant. If we assume, however, that the scofflaw state is unwilling to bear the costs of
retaliation indefinitely, then it has an incentive to engage in a war of attrition against the
injured state only if it believes that the injured state also has a breaking point.
Second, the injured state will fit the war of attrition model if it relies only on
export group pressure because it will then also have a breaking point. To illustrate why
this is so, assume that both consumers and export interest groups in an injured state are
willing to invest some positive political expenditure to influence a retaliation outcome.
Let the consumers’ political expenditure (against retaliation) equal c and the export
interest groups’ expenditure (for retaliation) equal e. In the post judgment phase, at time t
= 0, it is safe to assume that e > c > 0 because export groups would be better able to
overcome collective action problems than consumer groups. But for these export interest
groups, the level of expenditure that they are willing to invest at any specific time is a
function of their beliefs regarding the probability of compliance by the scofflaw state. In
other words, if the export groups believe that the scofflaw state is unlikely to comply even
in the face of retaliation, they would be less willing to invest in retaliation. In turn, the
export groups’ belief about the scofflaw state’s probability of compliance is also a function
of the amount of time the scofflaw state spends not complying. We would expect that the
longer the scofflaw state holds out, the greater the likelihood that it will never comply. At
52
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time tn,, where e = c, the political costs and benefits of retaliation to the injured state are
now equal and the injured state would have reached its breaking point. In other words, at
time tn , which is when the injured state will concede the game if the scofflaw state has not
already done so, the export groups’ marginal happiness from retaliation is now equal to
the consumers’ marginal resentment. Figure 1 below is a simple graphical depiction of the
injured state’s breaking point when only export groups are investing political expenditures
in favor of retaliation.
Level of political expenditure

tn

Time of non-compliance

FIGURE 1: The Injured State’s Breaking Point in War of Attrition
Let us change the model and assume that the injured state also has significant
protectionist groups that would also benefit from retaliation. Assume further that the
protectionists are willing to invest a level of political expenditure equal to p to support
retaliation against the scofflaw state. If we assume that the protectionist interest groups
are better positioned to overcome collective action problems than consumers, then p > c.
Moreover, since protectionists stand to benefit from retaliatory tariffs regardless of
whether or not the scofflaw state complies, the level of p is likely to remain constant over
time. Thus, the total marginal political expenditure in favor of retaliation in the injured
state = p + e. In this picture, the injured state no longer has a breaking point because it
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would be willing to commit to retaliation indefinitely. In other words, even though
politicians in the injured state still incur political costs from holding out, such costs are
offset by the political benefits they obtain from protectionist groups. Figure 2 depicts the
marginal political expenditure in favor of retaliation in the injured state when significant
protectionist interest groups are present.
Level of political expenditure

Time of non-compliance
FIGURE 2: The Injured State’s Political Expenditure with Protectionist Groups
The foregoing analysis shows that a domestic political environment has significant
implications for the strategic interactions among states at the enforcement phase of an
international trade dispute. If a scofflaw state has a breaking point but it believes that the
injured state does not have one because of significant protectionist pressures, then it has
strong incentives to comply even before the injured state retaliates. In other words, the
presence of a significant protectionist group in the injured state improves the injured
state’s ability to influence the compliance incentives of the scofflaw nation. This dynamic
interaction suggests a somewhat paradoxical result: the presence of strong protectionist
groups in potential injured states may be instrumental in generating credibility in the WTO’s
enforcement mechanism.
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B.

Asymmetric Retaliation Costs and the Role of Uncertainty
The analysis in the previous section assumed a condition in which states value the

interests of protectionist groups over those of consumers who are harmed by import
restrictive policies. While this may represent the political reality in many major
democracies, the actual commitment of political actors to protectionist policies varies
across states. There are two major reasons why we might expect political actors to
sometimes value the welfare interests of consumers over those of protectionist interest
groups.
First, politicians in non-democratic states that do not face electoral constraints
may have less of an incentive to value the interests of protectionist groups.53 Second, and
more significantly, certain consumer groups in democratic states may be able to overcome
collective action problems and become more politically potent than protectionist groups.
This latter situation is likely to be the case consumer groups consists of industrial
concerns that import many of their inputs. For instance, the unilateral repeal of
agricultural tariffs by the British government in the nineteenth century has been largely
attributed to the pressure of a well-organized coalition of industrial concerns that favored
free trade policies. 54 More recently, in various WTO disputes, industrial consumer groups
in the United States and the European Community have strongly lobbied against
retaliation measures that would raise the costs of their inputs.55
With complete information regarding each state’s preference for protectionist
policies, states might be able to foresee what would happen if they breached their free
53
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trade commitments. Significantly, since the credibility of a retaliation threat depends
largely on the existence of a strong domestic constituency that favors retaliation, states
that do not face such pressures would be at a strong tactical disadvantage in enforcing
their trade agreements. For instance, state A might recognize that state B would be
unwilling to commit to a long course of retaliation if it knows that state B lacks a
comparatively strong domestic protectionist constituency. In such a framework, states
with low retaliation costs would have in an incentive to breach their commitments to
states with high retaliation costs.
In reality, however, such complete information about each state’s preferences is
highly unlikely. Indeed, the problem of uncertainty or asymmetric information in
international relations has received considerable attention from political scientists over
the past couple of years.56 In international economic relations, each state that participates
in trade negotiations is likely to be uncertain about the true domestic interest preferences
of other states.57 The presence of uncertainty provides an incentive for each state to
understate its costs of retaliation by exaggerating the power of domestic protectionist
interests. Thus, a state that may be relatively indifferent to protectionist policies may
pretend that it faces strong protectionist pressures in order to signal its resolve to retaliate
in the event of a breach. Political scientists and economists have argued that such bluffing
strategies are common among states seeking a bargaining advantage in international
negotiations.58
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Given the incentives that states have to misrepresent their true preferences
regarding domestic restraints, it is reasonable to expect other states to attempt to unmask
such tactical smokescreens. Indeed, one might expect that in democratic regimes, the
ability of politicians to exploit private information regarding the influence of domestic
constituencies would be limited. But there are many reasons why certainty about the true
preferences of democratic states may still remain elusive.
First, politicians in a democratic state may be able to influence patterns of
mobilization among interest groups through legislation or by manipulating institutional
rules.59 Second, it is not just the size and concentration of interest groups that matters, but
their political clout vis a vis other groups. An interest group’s political clout usually
depends on two factors: (1) the intensity of the interest group’s pressures and; (2) the
ability of politicians to withstand such pressures. But none of these two factors is likely to
be observed correctly by foreign states. Indeed, it is not clear that even domestic political
insiders will have the ability to measure the relative political clout of interest groups
before the actual outcome of a political bargain.60 In any event, attempts by foreign states
to discern the relative political clout of domestic interest groups in international
negotiations have often proven to be unsuccessful. For instance, Robert Putnam describes
the futility of American efforts to understand German interest groups dynamics in the
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wake of the 1978 Bonn negotiations to deal with global reflation.61 In that episode, both
the German and the Americans seemed to face great difficulties in understanding each
other’s domestic politics even though they were both major democracies with relatively
transparent political institutions.
In the context of WTO’s enforcement regime, uncertainty about a state’s
domestic preferences becomes a strategic tool which helps improve the credibility of
retaliation threats. To understand the role of uncertainty in this picture, let us assume
that a scofflaw state knows its own private costs for non-compliance, but is unaware of
the retaliation costs of the other state. If the scofflaw state’s costs for non-compliance are
very low relative to the political benefits it receives, it may be willing to hold out
indefinitely. One such scenario would be where the domestic protectionist pressures on
the scofflaw nation are so great that the politicians invariably cave in to their demands. In
such a case, the injured state’s retaliation costs are irrelevant because no threat of any
duration is likely to deter the scofflaw state.
If we assume, however, that the scofflaw state has a definable breaking point, then
it would have a different non-compliance strategy. In deciding whether to breach its
commitments, the potential scofflaw state has to weigh two different risks: (1) the risk
that the injured state has no breaking point because of the presence of significant
domestic groups that would always benefit from retaliation, and; (2) the risk that the
injured state has a breaking point but might nevertheless win the war of attrition game.
The problem is that the scofflaw state has no basis for determining the injured state’s true
retaliation costs or breaking point ex ante. For its part, the injured state always has an
incentive to pretend that it derives large benefits from retaliation and that the welfare
costs it incurs from high tariffs are politically insignificant. Thus, given the presence of
uncertainty, a retaliation threat by a state with a weak protectionist audience may
nevertheless be credible.

61

See Putnam, supra note 53 at 452. As Putnam observes, “‘[g]overnments generally do not do too well
in analyzing each other’s internal politics in crises [and I would add in normal times], and indeed it is
inherently difficult.’” Id. (quoting GLENN H. SNYDER & PAUL DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS:
BARGAINING, DECISION MAKING, AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES 522-23 (1977)).

25

C.

The Special Case of Developing Countries
One possibility is that this paper’s emphasis on retaliation as an enforcement

strategy is misplaced with respect to developing countries. Such countries, many
commentators and diplomats argue, lack the requisite market power to utilize retaliation
effectively against more powerful trading units like the United States or the EC.62 More
significantly, some of these commentators argue, developing states fear that they may be
subject to future sanctions in other foreign policy spheres if they retaliate against more
powerful trading partners.63
At first blush, the argument that developing countries face a disadvantage in
enforcing their free trade benefits seems rather straightforward. Since developing states
lack market power, the argument goes, their ability to induce developed states to comply
with their trade obligations through retaliation is very limited.64 But upon further
examination, however, it is not obvious why developing states would necessarily be
subject to higher retaliation costs than developed states. The domestic political economy
incentives for states to retaliate vary considerably. The fact that one developing state (or
one developed state) may have found it difficult to retaliate in one particular dispute,
such as Ecuador in the EC Bananas dispute,65 tells us very little about how other
developing states might react in other disputes. Other developing states could have
relatively strong protectionist audiences that might otherwise make retaliation a
politically desirable option. As Bhagwati and Panagariya have recently observed, poorer
countries have on the average higher protectionist barriers to trade than rich countries.66
What this observation suggests is that the political economy factors that make retaliation
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politically attractive to certain interest groups in developed states are also likely to be
present in many developing states. Indeed, recent empirical data on the role of developing
countries in WTO dispute settlement suggests that developing countries are not at all
disadvantaged in their ability to threaten retaliation against other states.67
A more plausible explanation for the reservation many developing countries might
have about retaliation is the relative lack of choice these developing states face with
respect to retaliation targets. In other words, developing countries may face a narrower
range of options concerning products from developed states and many of those options
may not even be politically salient industries in the developed state. Moreover, if a
developing country’s imports from a developed county consists largely of capital inputs for
industries, then it is highly unlikely that that the developing state will possess the
requisite domestic political audience that will support retaliation.
The relative lack of choice of products for retaliation from developed states does
not mean that developing countries are always disadvantaged in enforcing their trade
commitments. Indeed, the availability of cross-retaliation as a remedy suggests that
developing countries may be narrowing any enforcement gap with developed states, to the
extent such an enforcement gap exists. The efficacy of cross-retaliation as an enforcement
strategy was recently demonstrated by Ecuador in the EC-Bananas dispute. After the
WTO ruled that the EC’s regime for the importation of Bananas violated numerous
GATT and GATS provisions,68 Ecuador sought the right to suspend concessions against
the EC.69 In its retaliation request, however, Ecuador argued that since most of its imports
from the EC consisted of capital goods and raw materials that were essential to its
economy, it could not afford to impose any retaliatory sanctions in the goods sector.70
Instead, Ecuador requested authority under Article 22 of the DSU to cross-retaliate by
67
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suspending various obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In an unprecedented move, the DSU eventually
granted Ecuador’s request to suspend concessions worth $202 million, with the proviso
that up to $141.6 million could be in the form of suspended intellectual property rights
under the TRIPS agreement.71 In the end, the EC decided to settle its dispute with
Ecuador.
Ecuador’s experience with cross-retaliation illustrates one innovative response to
the perceived enforcement gap between developing and developed states. Mexico has
proposed another: that developing countries should have the option of auctioning off
their retaliation rights to states that can benefit from them.72 The problem with Mexico’s
suggestion, however, is that it is prone to the same pathologies as a group sanction
remedy.73 If state A, which has been harmed by a trade inconsistent measure by state B,
auctions off its retaliation rights to state C, then state C will not have much have an
incentive to choose a retaliation strategy that induces compliance. Since state C has not
itself been harmed by trade inconsistent measures, it is unlikely to be subject to a
domestic political audience that wants the trade inconsistent measure removed. Instead,
state C is more likely to choose a retaliation strategy that would maximize benefits to its
domestic protectionist audience. But the problem is that a retaliation strategy that
maximizes benefits for a domestic protectionist audience is not necessarily the same
strategy that would induce compliance. Thus, with a regime that permits states to auction
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off retaliation rights, one is very likely to increase the level of protectionist benefits
without any offsetting incentives for increased compliance.
Finally, the related concern that developed countries may take action against
developing states that exercise their retaliation rights is a red herring.74 Regardless of what
enforcement mechanism that is in place, developed states may still act against developing
states if the ultimate goal is to discourage developing states from vindicating their WTO
rights. This concern has much more to do with the general asymmetric nature of the
relationship between developed and developing states, however, than it has to do with
any specific shortcomings of the retaliation remedy.
IV. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND THE HAZARDS OF INFORMATION-FORCING DEVICES
Given the centrality of uncertainty to the WTO’s enforcement mechanism, the
question remains: what kind of remedial goals should it have? Some economic and legal
commentators have generally argued that the goal of the system is compensation and not
specific performance.75 More interestingly, these commentators have argued that the
WTO endorses the notion of an efficient breach, which suggests that the WTO rules do
not deter the breach of an underlying trade agreement where the breach offers a pareto
superior outcome.76 This Part challenges this view and argues that the injection of
contractual notions of efficient breach into the WTO remedial scheme is erroneous.
Section A suggests first that as a descriptive matter, contractual concepts like efficient
breach or compensation do not fit well in an environment where there is no higher
sovereign that can compel parties to observe their contractual obligations. The second
part of the argument is more normative: given the role of uncertainty in the WTO
enforcement mechanism, specific performance rather than compensation better reflects
74
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the trade liberalizing goals of the WTO. Section B explores the role of reciprocity in
WTO regime as the strict exchange of equivalent benefits and suggests that such
equivalence is grounded in customary international law norms and does not reflect an
endorsement of efficient breach principles.
A.

The Limitations of Efficient Breach and Other Contract Principles in the WTO’s
Enforcement Mechanism
Many legal and economic commentators tend to employ contractual terms like

damages and efficient breach in describing the remedial goals of the WTO’s enforcement
mechanism.77 But trying to understand international trade agreements in such contractual
terms is wrong, or is at least somewhat misleading. Agreements and disputes among states
in the international realm are very much different from those in the domestic legal
context. As Robert Hudec once observed, “international legal arrangements have
relatively more in common with the law of primitive societies studied by anthropologists,
in which litigation is still emerging as a tenuous alternative to dispute resolution by
force.”78 Hudec’s observation helps explain why so many domestic contractual concepts
may have little or no relevance in international law.
Take the equitable remedy of specific performance, for instance. In a domestic
legal setting, the efficacy of specific performance depends on the existence of a judicial
order—backed by the coercive authority of the state—that compels a promisor to perform
his contractual promise. In the realm of international law, however, there is no higher
sovereign that can compel scofflaw states to meet their contractual obligations. As Judith
Bello notes, “the WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no
77
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truncheons or tear gas.”79 Bello’s observation is also true of most, if not all, international
institutions responsible for implementing or monitoring international agreements. In
theory, any state is almost always free to breach any of its international commitments,
provided it is willing to incur the relevant reputational costs and/or face retaliation. In
other words, unlike courts in domestic contract disputes, international institutions lack
the mechanism to impose sanctions harsh enough that a promisor will always chose
performance over non-compliance.80 This particular reality about inter-state cooperation
is not a mere feature of institutional design, but is inherent in the very nature of
international legal environment. For this reason, debates about whether a particular
international legal regime endorses specific performance or compensation are largely
misplaced. The international legal system is simply not developed enough for one to make
such nuanced legal distinctions.
Given the limitations of in the international legal order, a coherent positivist
analysis of the remedial goals of the WTO that employs contract analogies seems unlikely.
A different, but related, inquiry could take a more normative approach: if we assume that
the WTO’s goals are to promote trade liberalization among its members, would specific
performance or compensation better accomplish those goals?
The answer depends on the incentives generated by each remedial scheme.
Generally, much of the scholarly commentary on contract remedies has focused on the
award of damages or compensation.81 At the heart of the damages regime is the notion of
the efficient breach, which recognizes that there are circumstances in which breaching
rather than performing a contract may make one party better off, without making the
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other worse off. The efficiency of this approach is seriously open to question, however, in
the context of international trade agreements.
First, the efficient breach approach seems inappropriate when applied to the
WTO context because it can eliminate or substantially undermine the uncertainty that is
inherent in trade disputes and negotiations, rendering retaliation ineffective as an
enforcement mechanism. As discussed in Part II, uncertainty about each state’s
retaliation costs increases the chance that retaliation will be an effective deterrent.82 This
is because a scofflaw state is more likely to capitulate if it believes that there is an ex ante
possibility–even if it is never brought to fruition–that it will suffer sustained noncompliance costs. However, scofflaw states that refuse to comply with the DSU
recommendations in the face of retaliation can undermine this uncertainty by forcing an
injured state to reveal its true retaliation costs. In the absence of uncertainty, potential
scofflaw states will have an incentive to defect whenever the political costs of retaliation
to the injured state are high enough to make sustained retaliation unlikely.
Ecuador’s retaliation dilemma in the EC Bananas dispute underscores the
significant role of uncertainty in the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism and how noncompliance undermines that role. By putting Ecuador to the test, the EC was able to
demonstrate that Ecuador had significant retaliation costs, thus undermining Ecuador’s
ability to issue credible retaliation threats in future trade disputes within the GATT
regime. In public choice parlance, Ecuador’s politicians revealed a political preference for
consumer interests over those of protectionist groups. In the end, however, the
availability of a cross-retaliation option improved Ecuador’s leverage and it showed that it
was still capable of making credible retaliation threats when its WTO obligations are
breached by a scofflaw state, especially when the scofflaw state has significant intellectual
property interests.
Second, an efficient breach or compensatory approach is also an inappropriate fit
for the WTO’s enforcement scheme because retaliation does not compensate the injured
party in a trade dispute. In domestic contract disputes, the efficiency rationale for the
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efficient breach approach is that it provides expectation damages to the promisee while
simultaneously allowing the promisor to reap any profits that exceed the losses to the
promisee.83 In the international trade context, however, the remedy of retaliation does
not provide any compensation or damages to the parties injured by the breach—the
export interest groups in the injured state. For such export interest groups, retaliation is
only a useful remedial device if it induces specific performance. Indeed, far from
compensating the injured parties, retaliation actually tends to hurt the injured state, as
Ecuador’s experience in the EC-Bananas’ dispute illustrates. And although protectionist
interest groups may benefit from retaliatory actions, such benefits are clearly incidental to
the goals of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. In the end, the objective of retaliation
is not to compensate protectionist interest groups, but to induce compliance by scofflaw
states. Indeed, various provisions of the DSU make it clear that compliance with the
recommendations of the DSB is required.84 And while the DSU does provide for
negotiated compensation among the disputants, it seems clear that such compensation is
simply an alternative to retaliation but not to compliance.85
Recent WTO decisions and actions by WTO members support the notion that
the WTO’s enforcement mechanism establishes a preference for specific performance
rather than compensation. For instance, arbitrators adjudicating various retaliation
proposals in WTO disputes have made it clear that the objective of retaliation is to ensure
83
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compliance by the non-conforming state.86 Indeed, these arbitrators have acknowledged
that in the absence of such compliance “the enforcement mechanism of the WTO
dispute settlement system could not function properly.”87
More importantly, the actors in the various disputes have also acted as if specific
performance was the goal of the WTO’s remedial mechanism. In both the Bananas and
Beef Hormones disputes, for instance, the EC did not take the position that it could
breach its obligations indefinitely as long as it was willing to face sanctions. Indeed, prior
to the eventual settlement of the Bananas dispute, the EC specifically agreed to bring its
regime into compliance,88 and subsequently insisted that it had actually done so by
making regulatory changes to it bananas import regime.89 The United States, for its part,
argued that retaliation in the Bananas dispute was only a last resort measure designed to
induce compliance by the EC.90 Indeed, the United States was so incensed by the EC’s
non-compliance and delay tactics in that dispute that it also considered the unusual
remedy of suspending the landing rights of European airlines.91 This is hardly the kind of
remedial option a party would consider in the context of a compensatory regime. In the
Beef Hormones dispute, the EC’s position has been that the WTO’s ruling allows it to
keep its ban in place until it can justify it using better scientific methods, albeit with the
understanding that such a justification has to occur within a reasonable period of time.92
The United States disagrees, of course, with the EC’s interpretation of the WTO’s Beef
Hormones decision, but none of the parties has argued that a violation of a WTO
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obligation is permissible provided the injured party can retaliate by suspending market
concessions.93
An argument that has been raised against specific performance in international
trade agreements involves the reality that trade agreements are, by their very nature,
incomplete contracts.94 In other words, because trade negotiators cannot foresee all future
contingencies that might constitute violations of a WTO rule, states will often face
circumstances ex post that they did not anticipate would be addressed by the agreement.95
For instance, a state might find itself later in a position where it would face enormous
domestic political costs if it does not violate its treaty commitments, but it might have
been very difficult to anticipate that situation ex ante. In such circumstances, the
proponents of efficient breach argue, states should feel free to violate their WTO
commitments when compliance would otherwise be “politically infeasible,”96 provided
that compensation or retaliation is available to the state[s] injured by the breach. Because
specific performance would force states to comply even when the political costs of
compliance are extraordinarily high, the argument goes, a compensation approach is
preferable.
The argument that the GATT and the other WTO trade agreements are
incomplete contracts seems somewhat indisputable. Indeed, uncertainty about future
contingencies is likely to be a feature of any international agreement where states face a
cooperative dilemma. It is not at all clear, however, that the enforcement of reciprocal
trade obligations is best served by encouraging an efficient breach approach. Indeed, the
flip side of specific performance—states tenaciously violating their trade commitments
whenever they are willing to bear the retaliation costs—would very likely result in trade
wars and would undermine the credibility of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism. In the
Bananas dispute, for instance, several United States legislators voiced strong frustration
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with the WTO dispute resolution process in the face of the EC’s non-compliance with the
WTO ruling in that case.97
There are two more effective ways of dealing with the problem of incompleteness
in international agreements: the first is to allow the parties to renegotiate their trade
commitments under various provisions of the GATT;98 the other is to encourage state
parties to exercise restraint and avoid bringing “politically loaded” or sensitive cases
before the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism.99 Interestingly, states seem to have
adopted both of these approaches to deal with the uncertainty of domestic political
pressures in trade disputes. For instance, Garrett and Smith have observed that with
respect to renegotiation, the United States and the EC agreed in the 1994 Uruguay round
to exclude agricultural subsidies from legal challenge until December 2003, with the
understanding that further negotiations on agricultural subsidies would continue once the
agreement expires.
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WTO’s Director-General advised states to try to resolve more disputes through
diplomatic channels and warned that asking the WTO to handle politically sensitive
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issues that were “not central to its work” would not only be “a recipe for failure[,] [i]t
could do untold harm to the trading system itself.”102
The adjudication avoidance strategy seems to be the approach taken by the EC in
its challenge to the United States Helms-Burton law, which penalizes certain foreign
companies doing business in Cuba. Facing a credible threat by the United States that it
would boycott the proceedings and refuse to comply with any WTO recommendations
should it lose, the EC decided to settle the dispute with the United States. In its
submission to the WTO, the United States invoked the political question doctrine in
arguing that the WTO lacked competence to adjudicate on the legality of the HelmsBurton law.103 After the WTO rejected those arguments, the United States openly
threatened to boycott the proceedings.104 Indeed, the threat was credible enough that
trade experts voiced concern that the legitimacy of the WTO would be undermined if the
dispute were to proceed to the decision phase.105
The United States’ stance in the dispute over the Helms-Burton legislation seems
inconsistent with the notion that the WTO embraces an efficient breach approach. If
efficient breach were an option available to disputants, then one would expect United
States to proceed with the case with the understanding that if it lost it could simply
compensate the EC or face retaliatory sanctions. Moreover, the EC’s willingness to back
out of the lawsuit, rather than risk the credibility of the WTO, suggests the superiority of
adjudication avoidance to an efficient breach approach. In any event, Garret and Smith
have documented numerous other instances where state parties have chosen to avoid
bringing cases to the WTO where domestic political pressures would make compliance
with WTO recommendations difficult.106
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B.

The Role of Equivalence in the WTO’s Retaliation Scheme
The WTO’s enforcement mechanism provides that retaliatory measures shall be

“equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”107 Various commentators have
seized upon this language to argue that the DSU endorses an efficient breach approach.108
If the member states of the WTO had preferred specific performance, the argument goes,
they would have provided for sanctions that were more severe than “equivalent”
retaliatory measures.109 One problem with this argument is that under the domestic
contract analogy, increasing the level of damages beyond that provided by expectation
damages regime would simply result in a liquidated damages scheme. By definition,
however, liquidated damages is not specific performance. Indeed, courts have routinely
held that liquidated damages provisions that are designed to compel performance are
non-enforceable. 110
A more significant problem with this argument is that it overlooks the reality that
the concepts of reciprocity and equivalence are pervasive throughout international law,
and are not just features of the GATT/WTO framework. More importantly, the
prevalence of these concepts in international law appear to reflect the reality of the
asymmetries of power in international relations and the need to control the escalation of
conflict in international disputes, rather than any endorsement of a notion of efficient
breach.
The notions of reciprocity and equivalence in international law are not of recent
vintage. As early as 1948, a commentator had proclaimed the notion of reciprocity as one
of the basic principles of international law.111 More recently, Elizabeth Zoller has argued
that reciprocity “is a condition theoretically attached to every legal norm of international

107

See Article 22.4 of the DSU.

108

See Sykes, Specific Performance, supra note 75; Sykes & Schwartz, The Economic Structure, supra note
75 at 182-85.
109

David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L 817, 818 (2002)

110

See e.g., Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F. Supp. 103, 106 (1977); but see Thomas Ulen, The Efficiency of
Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 350-53 (arguing
that courts should routinely enforce punitive liquidated damages clauses).
111

Ernst Schneeberger, Reciprocity as a Maxim of International Law, 37 GEO. L. J. 34, 38 (1948).

38

law.”112 Thus, we find instances of reciprocity operating in situations as diverse as the
Soviet-American détente of the 1970s,113 international disputes over airline routes,114 the
legality of the diversion of an international water-way,115 and the legality of the United
States’ military intervention in Vietnam.116 In 2001, the International Law Commission
(ILC) formally adopted the concept of reciprocity or countermeasures as part of its
articles on the implementation on state responsibility.117 More recently, WTO arbitrators
have explicitly adopted the ILC approach in determining the appropriate level of
retaliation necessary to induce compliance by the scofflaw state.118 Even though
reciprocity and equivalence apply to myriad other situations in international law, no one
would suggest that it reflects international law’s preference for an efficient breach
approach, especially as applied to armed conflict situations.119
The pervasive role of reciprocity in international law is not so difficult to
understand. The lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism in the international
community of states means that states often have to rely on self-help measures to achieve
compliance. Anthropologists have also shown that reciprocity or a tit-for-tat approach is
also very common in primitive social orders that lack formal enforcement and dispute
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resolution mechanisms.120 As Robert Axelrod has argued, in such environments
characterized by the absence of hierarchy, tit-for-tat or reciprocity is the best strategy for
inducing cooperation among egotistical actors.121 Reciprocity’s success as a cooperative
strategy in non-zero sum games may have a lot to do with both its “clarity” and the fact
that is collectively stable across time.122 In other words, a reciprocal strategy makes each
party aware in advance of the possible consequences of defection.
The notion that negative reciprocity should involve equivalent or commensurate
suspension of obligations is also not surprising. Since negative reciprocity or retaliation
involves exchanging “wrong for wrong,” there was always the implicit risk that the
strategy could escalate into a feud in which all parties could be made worse off.123 In
addition, there was also the concern that any “self help” remedial scheme would likely be
subject to abuse by powerful states.124 In any event, almost all reciprocity measures in
international law require that a retaliatory action be roughly equivalent to the amount of
the injury inflicted.125 Indeed, precisely because of the conflict escalating risk associated
with negative reciprocity, Axelrod suggested that a better enforcement strategy would be
to return “nine-tenths of a tit for a tat.”126 In this framework, however, the utility of the
strategy is not that it any way compensates the injured party, but that it provides
sufficient incentives to each party “not to try gratuitous defections.”127 Most recently, a
WTO arbitration panel reaffirmed that the goal of an “equivalent withdrawal of
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concessions” is to provide sufficient incentives to induce the scofflaw state to abandon its
illegal actions, and not to compensate the injured party for its damages.128
In addition to conflict escalation concerns, there is another good reason why
equivalent retaliation in international trade disputes is a desirable enforcement strategy: it
is fair and equitable given the existence of asymmetric trading volumes among WTO
members. Any enforcement strategy that gives states the power to retaliate by suspending
more than equivalent trade concessions would impose an unfair burden on states with low
volumes of trade concessions. To illustrate, let us assume that both states B and C have
suffered an equivalent amount of harm from state A’s refusal to comply with its trade
commitments, let us say $20 million. Let us also assume that the total amount of state
trade concessions that state B has offered to state A is $140 million and state C’s total
amount of trade concessions to state A is $30 million. Finally, let us assume further that
both states C and B have been granted the authority to retaliate against state A by
suspending trade concessions equal to two times the amount of injury they have each
suffered, that is $40 million. In this picture, state C is at a disadvantage because it can
only suspend up to $30 million worth of trade concessions whereas state B, which suffered
the same level of injury as state C, can easily afford to suspend trade concessions of up to
$40 million. Thus, if we had a trade enforcement regime that allowed “more than a tit for
a tat,” it would necessarily be unfair to states that do not have a significant volume of
trade concessions.
CONCLUSION
Using the tools of public choice analysis, this Article examines the interaction of
domestic interest groups and the WTO retaliation mechanism and argues that this
interaction provides significant benefits that are lacking in alternative remedial schemes.
First, by penalizing powerful export interest groups in a scofflaw state, retaliation enables
128

See Brazil-Canada Arbitration Decision, supra note 86, at para. 3.54 (“[I]f the actual level of
nullification or impairment is substantially lower than the subsidy, a countermeasure based on the level of
nullification or impairment will have less or no inducement effect and the subsidizing country may not
withdraw the measure at issue.”).
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political actors in scofflaw states to internalize the costs of defection from their free trade
commitments. Second, the presence of protectionist interest groups in the injured state (or
more correctly, the perception of the presence of such groups) may powerfully influence
the injured state’s ability to make credible threats to retaliate. This Article also suggests
that uncertainty about each state’s retaliation costs makes retaliation a credible
enforcement strategy even when states have varying levels of commitment to
protectionist policies.
Finally, this Article contends that the significant role of uncertainty in this model
suggests that specific performance, and not compensation, should be the goal of the
WTO’s enforcement mechanism. As a descriptive matter, attempts to interject
contractual notions of compensation and efficient breach into the WTO’s enforcement
mechanism are wrong or misleading. This is because the legal system that characterizes
the international trade regime is too rudimentary to admit of such domestic contract
analogies. More importantly, as a normative matter, this Article concludes that the
WTO’s goals of market liberalization would be better attained through a specific
performance approach: first, specific performance preserves the uncertainty that is
integral to the functioning of the WTO’s enforcement mechanism; second, specific
performance is the only remedy that is actually of use to the export groups in the injured
states—the parties actually injured by a scofflaw state’s breach of its obligations.
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